Two Kinds of Change: Comparing the Candidates on Foreign Policy by Justin Logan
FewU.S. presidential electionshavebeendecid-
ed on the basis of foreign policy. For the first time
in decades, however, both parties have fielded can-
didates who have chosen to emphasize their for-
eign policy views.
With many Americans regretting the conse-
quences of the Bush administration’s foreign pol-
icy, a relatively large number of voters are express-
ing interest in the topic. Accordingly, it is worth
examining the candidates’ views on the subject to
attempt to determine what their foreign policies
would look like.
Republican John McCain, with his long stint
in national politics, has attempted to frame the
foreign policy issue around the question of expe-
rience. But evaluating McCain’s foreign policy
positions reveals a candidate consistently dedi-
cated to confrontation, threats, and the use of
military power.
Democrat Barack Obama, a new face on the
national scene, has chosen to emphasize the need
for change in the way in which U.S. foreign policy
is conducted.Obamahas called formore focus on
diplomacy, less on military action, and an end to
the “politics of fear.” However, an examination of
Obama’s advisers and policy ideas makes it clear
that Obama is anything but a noninterventionist.
In the end, both candidates have significant
flaws in their foreign policy ideas. Yet McCain’s
approach seems likely to amplify and repeat the
errors of the Bush administration. A President
McCain would promise more provocation, more
intervention, andmore strain on themilitary, the
budget, and the country.
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Introduction
Historically, few U.S. presidential elections
have been decided on the basis of foreign pol-
icy. However, seven years into the struggle
against terrorism and five and a half years
into the war in Iraq, voters have indicated a
growing frustration with the failures of the
Bush administration’s foreign policies. The
Democratic candidate, Sen. Barack Obama,
has made his opposition to the Iraq war and
broad denunciations of the Bush foreign pol-
icy a key theme of his campaign.
Sen. John McCain, the Republican nomi-
nee, has vacillated between two positions on
theBush foreignpolicy. Before announcinghis
campaign, McCainmade clear that he broadly
endorsed the administration’s approach to ter-
rorism and Iraq. At the same time—and this
theme has reemerged in the campaign—
McCaincriticized theBushpolicy forbeing too
timid. According to McCain, Bush had not
sent enough troops to Iraq, and he had acted
rashly in foreclosing the military option on
North Korea. In speeches on the campaign
trail, McCain has attempted to distance him-
self from the Bush legacy, highlighting his crit-
icism of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
and his willingness to criticize aspects of the
Iraq occupation.
The next U.S. president will inherit a host
of foreign policy challenges, some, though
not all of them created by the Bush adminis-
tration. How the next president will handle
those problems will do a great deal to deter-
mine the prospects for peace and the future
of U.S. national security. Accordingly, it is
worth examining the foreign policy stances
of each candidate.
Although there is peril in trying to figure
out how a political candidate would govern,
there is enough information to try to deter-
minewhich candidatewouldbemore likely to
move the United States in the direction of
peace and away from the neoconservative and
liberal interventionist influence that has
helped yield the state of affairs in which we
find ourselves today. For reasons of space and
focus, not every foreign policy issue can be
examined in one study. This paper attempts
to cover the issues wherein either (1) the can-
didate’s view represents a significant break
from recent U.S. foreign policy or (2) the like-
ly implications of the candidate’s views would
be either positive or negative for U.S. national
security.
Admittedly, this approach has shortcom-
ings. Issuesof extremelyhigh importance, such
as U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Europe relations,
andnonproliferation efforts aredownplayedat
the expense of issues such as the future politi-
cal arrangements in the Middle East.1 But giv-
en that recent U.S. foreign policy has been
focused so disproportionately onmatters such
as the Middle East, it is necessary to examine
the areas in which significant change in one
direction or another is likely to take place.
JohnMcCain:
The Second Coming of
Teddy Roosevelt?
JohnMcCain has assiduously—and success-
fully—cultivated an image of himself as a mav-
erick, willing to defy Republican orthodoxy on
a range of issues. One area in whichMcCain is
nomoderate is foreignaffairs.Longafavoriteof
the war-friendly Weekly Standard magazine
(fromwhosemastheadmanyofhis foreignpol-
icy advisers are drawn), McCain has admired
and identifiedwithwar hawks like the bellicose
Teddy Roosevelt. In an interview with the New
York Times, McCain described Roosevelt as his
“conservativemodel,” pointingout to the inter-
viewersRoosevelt’s instincts “asa fellowreform-
er and environmentalist” and highlighting
Roosevelt’s “assertive foreign policy.”2
McCain once wrote that Roosevelt “be-
lieved fighting was essential to a happy life. I
know what he meant.”3 Instead of pursuing a
career in the boxing industry, however,
McCain has chosen the arena of national pol-
itics. One thing is certain: if for McCain more
fighting means more happiness, the implica-
tions of his stated ideas on foreign affairs will
make him very happy.4
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Matt Welch, author ofMcCain: The Myth of
aMaverickwrites that “JohnMcCain envisions
amoremilitaristic foreignpolicy thananyU.S.
president in a century.”5 While it is impossible
todivine fromacandidate’s stated foreignpol-
icy ideas what his actual approach to foreign
policy would look like (recall the disparity
between candidate GeorgeW. Bush and Presi-
dent George W. Bush, for example), John Mc-
Cain has advanced a consistent and laudably
transparent message for any possible adver-
saries: Watch Out, YouMight Be Next.
McCain believes that the foreign policy
choices available to the United States are lim-
ited to the extremes of serving asworld police-
man or retreating behind the walls of “For-
tress America,” and without global American
military dominance—and the willingness to
use force—the world would collapse into
widespread conflict, and freedom would be
destroyed by the forces of tyranny. AsMcCain
put it in his defense of the first Gulf War, if
America failed to act, “there will be inevitably
a succession of dictators” that would present
“a threat to the stability of this entire globe.”6
The New York Times’ Matt Bai interviewed
McCain in 2008 and concluded that “while
most politicians looked at injustice in a for-
eign land and asked, ‘Why intervene?’McCain
seemed to look at that same injustice and ask
himself, ‘Why not?’”7
In his 1999 Landon Lecture at Kansas
State University, McCain explained his criti-
cisms of the Clinton administration’s foreign
policy. The roots of Clinton’s failings, accord-
ing to McCain, were “strategic incoherence
and self-doubt.” It is ironic that in the very
same speech, McCain invoked and endorsed
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s
“indispensable nation” description of the
United States. Describing one’s ownnation in
such a way positively bristles with arrogance
and self-assurance—the furthest thing from
self-doubt one could imagine.8 But McCain
took the self-congratulation a step further,
noting that the reason America is the indis-
pensable nation is because the country is “the
greatest force for good in human history.”
The actions of a country that represents
such goodness could rarely be destructive or
pernicious. Althoughhe allowed in the Landon
Lecture that “we have made our share of mis-
takes in thepast,”McCaincouldnotbringhim-
self to mention even one, warning instead that
there was a danger that confronting our errors
too candidly could lead us “to confer on others
the primary responsibility for protecting our
interests and values.” In keeping with this
thinking, throughout the 1990s, McCain was
oneof themost vocal supportersof foreignmil-
itary interventions, favoring the Gulf War and
the Somalia intervention (after theBlackHawk
Down incident, McCain supported cutting off
funding for the troops in the field, later ruing
this position as having been an endorsement of
“a retreat in the face of aggression froman infe-
rior foe”9); strongly opposing and then strongly
supporting the Bosnia intervention; and
proposing an expansion of the Kosovo war to
introduce U.S. ground troops into Serbia.10
McCain’s 2007 call to expand the active duty
Army and Marine Corps from the already-
inflated level of 750,000 to 900,000 should
serve as an indication ofMcCain’s views on the
role of themilitary in the coming years.11
Senator McCain has repeatedly explained
his thinking on the centrality of American
foreign-policy activism to the prosperity and
livability of the globe. In a 2006 interviewwith
Playboymagazine,McCain revealed that “fun-
damentally I agree with the so-called neocon-
servatives because I believe we can do a better
job of helping people achieve democracy and
freedom, and we should exercise this influ-
ence for good. But not by launching preemp-
tive strikes and unseating people and doing
bad things. By doing good things.”12
But what Senator McCain is eliding here is
that he and his neoconservative confreres fre-
quently conflate “doing good things” with
“launching preemptive strikes and unseating
people.” As Time columnist Joe Klein has ob-
served, the neoconservative approach to foreign
policy can be described as “unilateral bellicosity
cloaked in the utopian rhetoric of freedom and
democracy.”13 To see the conflation of the two
concepts, one can examine Senator McCain’s
boosting of Iraqi charlatanAhmedChalabi.
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ADubious Past: McCain, the INC, and
the Iraq Liberation Act
John McCain’s long relationship with the
IraqiNationalCongress, its head, AhmedChal-
abi, and the efforts to oust Saddam Hussein
show the problems inherent in “doing good
things” in pursuit of expansive foreign policy
goals. Chalabi was, since the early 1990s, one of
the leading proponents of removing Saddam
Hussein frompower. Renowned for his powers
of persuasion and Western affect, Chalabi
became a central player in pre-warWashington,
arguing to any audience who would listen that
Hussein was in league with al Qaeda, and that
he possessed both the capability and intention
to useweapons ofmass destruction against the
United States. Chalabi simultaneously held
himself out as a potential leader of post-war
Iraq.
The Chalabi experience, of course, ended
badly, with the U.S. intelligence community
raiding a Chalabi compound in Iraq after it
suspected that he had notified Iranian intel-
ligence that U.S. agencies had broken their
code and had been intercepting their com-
munications. Shortly thereafter, the fact that
Chalabi’s faction failed to win even one seat
in parliament in the December 2005 elec-
tions made clear how naïve Chalabi’s sup-
porters in Washington had been.
Randy Scheunemann, McCain’s chief for-
eign policy adviser and a former lobbyist for
Chalabi, recently protested that although
Senator McCain did lead the charge to use
Iraqi exiles to help oust Saddam Hussein, he
“wasn’t pushing one [exile] group over anoth-
er.”14 But the facts show that McCain had a
uniquely close relationship with Chalabi, and
was considered one of his foremost champi-
ons inWashington.
In the 1990s, Chalabi began a determined
campaign of lobbying in Washington, particu-
larly on Capitol Hill. McCain got in on the
ground floor, acting as a forceful proponent of
Chalabi beginning in 1991.15 In a January 1999
hearing of the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee,McCainberatedGen.AnthonyZinni fordis-
paraging the Iraqi opposition and the Iraq
Liberation Act, which McCain had co-spon-
sored.16During the samehearing,McCain chas-
tisedGen.Zinni at length fornotattacking Iraqi
airfields thatwerebeyond theno-fly zones—and
therefore beyond the scope of themission craft-
ed by policymakers and given to CENTCOM.
McCain closed the exchange with a terse state-
ment to Gen. Zinni that “if you want to sit and
insult my intelligence and that of other mem-
bers of the committee, that’s finewithme.”17
Although the State Department had largely
stymied the efforts in the1990s—ledbySenator
McCain—to ensure that funds allocated for the
INC were disbursed, Chalabi’s friends in
Washington saw a new opportunity after
September 11.18 In December 2001, a group of
nine legislators sent a letter to President Bush,
urging that not only was it “imperative that we
plan toeliminate the threat fromIraq,”but that
the president begin “immediately to assist the
Iraqi opposition on the ground inside Iraq by
providing them money and assistance already
authorized and appropriated.”19 The letter
includedbotha lengthydefenseof the INCand
JohnMcCain’s signature.
McCain made a long, impassioned speech
on the floor of the Senate on October 2, 2002,
defending the resolution that started the Iraq
war. Read today, the speech is a baleful
reminder of the twin afflictions that character-
ized the charge to war: false certitude about
Saddam Hussein’s future capabilities and
intentions and wild-eyed optimism about the
postwarenvironment.McCainfalselyportrayed
the option of avoiding war as one that would
cause “our people to live in fear behind walls
thathavealreadybeenbreached, asour enemies
plan our defeat in the time we have given them
todoit.”Hewarneddarklyofcollusionbetween
Hussein and al Qaeda (“whether or not it has
happened, the odds favor it”). The senator
spoke with near-religious certitude about
Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program (and his
“inevitable” acquisition of nuclear weapons
should the United States decline to invade) as
well as about the outlook for postwar Iraq (“it’s
a safe assumption that Iraqis will be grateful to
whoever is responsible for securing their free-
dom”).20 As it turned out, McCain was wrong
on nearly every count.
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All of this certainty came from a man who
had declined even to read the National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq.21
All the while, McCain maintained close ties
with Chalabi. During aMarch 2002 60Minutes
profile of Chalabi, Lesley Stahl accompanied
him on a visit toMcCain’s office. The segment
showed Senator McCain greeting Chalabi
warmly and by name, assuring him that he
hopedtheefforts togetChalabi’s groupfunded
would “turn into some significant help for
you.”Stahl reportedthat in“touchingbasewith
pro-Chalabimembers ofCongress, like Senator
John McCain . . . [Chalabi] and a group of his
INC colleagues got the expected warm recep-
tion.”22McCainwouldcontinuetopro-test that
Chalabiwas not receiving support after thewar
had started, signing a letter with four
Republican colleagues in April 2003 complain-
ing that Chalabi was not being adequately
funded, and grousing on “Good Morning
America” that we should be “bringing in
Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress as
soon as possible.”23
McCaindoesn’t seem tohave learnedmuch
from theChalabi experience. Even after all that
transpired, he chose Randy Scheunemann to
be his chief foreign policy adviser although
Scheunemann is a former lobbyist for Chalabi
and was a key figure in helping pass the Iraq
Liberation Act when he worked for Senator
Trent Lott in 1998. After Chalabi was revealed
to have provided bad information to the
United States about Iraq during the run-up to
the war (“constantly shoving crap at us” was
how DIA analyst Mark Garlasco memorably
characterized the INC’s role),24 McCain evi-
dently saw no reason why Chalabi’s chief
booster in the United States shouldn’t be put
in charge of his foreign policy team.25 More-
over, starting in the 1990s, Charlie Black, the
senior political adviser to the campaign, col-
lected hundreds of thousands of dollars as a
lobbyist promoting Ahmed Chalabi and his
INC.26Having chosenneoconservative advisers
such as Scheunemann and Chalabi PR men
likeBlack,McCain’s campaign teamrepresents
a reunion of the various activists who helped
start the Iraq war.
McCain’s sourcesof informationon Iraq led
him to conclude repeatedly and erroneously
that the United States would have an easy time
of it, and once the occupation started, McCain
was a regular defender of the position that the
United States was “winning.” For example,
McCain told CNN in September 2002, during
the peak of the debate over invading, “I believe
that the successwill be fairly easy,” followingup
withanappearance inwhichhetoldCNNview-
ers that “I don’t think it’s, quote, ‘easy,’ but I
believe that we canwin an overwhelming victo-
ry in a very short period of time.”27
McCain greeted the now-infamous elec-
tions of January 2005 by ignoring the Sunni
boycott, whichwounduphelping set the stage
for the sectarian violence that would follow.
Instead, McCain glowed: “I feel wonderful. I
feel that the Iraqi people, by going to the polls
in the numbers that they did, authenticated
what the president said in his inaugural
speech: that all people seek freedom and
democracy and want to govern themselves.”28
ADangerous Present: “There Will Be
OtherWars”
Senator McCain has focused his campaign
on foreignpolicy, andhas laid out an admirably
broad, straightforward list of positions on a
number of issues. McCain has made detailed
statements on topics ranging from the nature
and duration of the U.S. military presence in
Iraq tohispolicy to stop Iran’snuclearprogram,
andhasadvocatedseveralnew initiatives includ-
ing: the formationofa“LeagueofDemocracies”
that would join the world’s democracies and
exclude Russia andChina; attempting to oust a
“revanchist”RussiafromtheG-8andexpanding
NATO to include Ukraine, Georgia, and “all
democracies committed to the defense of free-
dom”; attempting to work in cooperation with
Russiaonreducingnucleararsenals;andamuch
harder line on North Korea than the Bush
administrationhas taken. It isworthbrieflyana-
lyzing the senator’s position on each of these
issues.
Iraq
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Iraq are very high. Before an audience at the
American Enterprise Institute in 2007, he pro-
claimed that leaving Iraq would create a real
prospect for “a fundamental change in the
world where radical Islamic extremism domi-
nates the entire world.”29 McCain repeated
this thinking in June 2008whenhe responded
to a question from Fortune magazine asking
“Senator, what do you see as the gravest long-
term threat to the U.S. economy?” by saying “I
would think that the absolute gravest threat is
the struggle that we’re in against radical
Islamic extremism, which can affect, if they
prevail, our very existence.”30
Senator McCain was a leading critic of the
Bush administration’s implementation of the
war, criticizing especially the number of U.S.
troops in the country starting in 2003.31 In
2003, McCain called for “at least another full
division” to be deployed to Iraq.32 By 2004,
McCain was praising the decision to raise
troop levels from 115,000 to 135,000, noting
that “I’d like to believe it was my comments
[calling for more troops that promoted the
change], but in fact it’s the realities on the
ground.”33 In 2005, McCain told Meet the
Press that the number of U.S. troops on the
ground in Iraq was “probably enough,”34 but
135,000 troops turned out not to be a barrier
against civil war, so McCain ultimately called
for still more, supporting the 2007 decision to
send 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Iraq.
Strangely, though, at times McCain ap-
peared to be an ardent supporter of the Bush
approach and even of current bête noireDonald
Rumsfeld, telling Fox News in May 2004, after
the abuGhraib scandal andwith the Iraq insur-
gency raging, that Rumsfeld had “done a fine
job.”35 By December 2005McCain was reassur-
ingAmericans that “progress is beingmade in a
lot of Iraq. Overall, I think a year from now, we
will have made a fair amount of progress if we
stay the course. If I thought we weren’t making
progress, I’d be despondent.”36
By2006, however,McCainhadbegunchast-
ising the administration and its supporters for
having promised the American people that the
Iraq war would be “some kind of day at the
beach.”37 But as seen above, McCain’s track
record of predicting results in Iraq demon-
strates that he was one of the most errant ana-
lysts of what was transpiring.
ForSenatorMcCain, everypositivedevelop-
ment in Iraq has represented a watershed.
Every setbackhasbeen littlemore thana test of
America’s will. This is a dangerous view of the
world, particularly in the context of counterin-
surgency. Will is an inadequate tool for unrav-
eling indigenous resistance to foreign occupa-
tion. Military occupations are costly and
time-consuming endeavors, but they frequent-
ly fall victim to the paradox that dedicating
large numbers of resources for a long period of
time elicits resistance to the occupation in the
target country aswell as at home. Such endeav-
ors have a high failure rate, and in any case,
presidentialdoggedness ranks lowonthe listof
determinants of success.38 If a President
McCain continued to believe that the combi-
nation of will and more troops is a tonic for
dissolving foreign resistance tooccupation, the
United States could find itself in 2013—or
2018—still patrolling the streets of Baghdad.
Iran
The struggle with Iran over its nuclear pro-
gramwill likely be themost dangerous foreign
policy challenge of the next president’s tenure.
On the Iran issue, Senator McCain has taken
an uncompromising stand that both makes
the prospect of a diplomatic resolution remote
andall but commits theUnitedStates to going
to war again in the absence of such a diplo-
matic solution.
SenatorMcCain’s public comments on Iran
have includedhis singing “bomb,bomb,bomb,
bomb-bomb Iran” on the campaign trail to the
tune of the Beach Boys’ “Barbara Ann,” as well
as his jovial response to a question regarding
increased cigarette sales to Iran, saying “maybe
that’s a way of killing them.”39 Publicly joking
about killing foreigners and starting wars is a
significant concern. The diplomatic context
withIran is frail enoughwithoutthis sortofoff-
the-cuff statement. One might consider how a
candidate for the presidency in Iran jok-
ing about killing Americans would be received
here.
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This repeated tendency of McCain’s seems
to indicate a casual disregard for themost fun-
damental principles of diplomacy. Although
McCain’s statementshave garnered themajor-
ity of the media coverage of his views on Iran,
however, the senator’s campaign has given
muchmoredetailed and substantivepositions
on technical questions.
In response to a two-question question-
naire sent to the candidates by the Institute for
Science and International Security, McCain
indicated that “there can be no such thing as
an adequately controlled nuclear fuel cycle in
Iran.” He went on to propose that Iran rely on
foreign sources of fuel, and claimed that
“There is no circumstance under which the
international community could be confident
that uranium enrichment or plutonium pro-
duction activities undertaken by the current
government of Iran are purely for peaceful
purposes.”40
The problem with that position is that the
Iranian government has stated that it views
enrichment on its territory as its sovereign
right under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and that it has no intention of ceding
this right.41 While there are differing interpre-
tations of the NPT that do not support Iran’s
view, the fact remains that Iran views enrich-
ment as a sovereign right and has repeatedly
expressed its unwillingness to look outside its
borders for fuel.McCain’s position, combined
with his insistence that Iran suspend uranium
enrichment before negotiations could take
place (a demand Iran has also repeatedly
rejected)means that in all likelihood the clock
will continue to run out until Iran reaches the
precipice of possessing a nuclear capability.
And John McCain has made abundantly
clear that he would prefer a war with Iran to
deterring and containing anuclear Iran.While
many scholars have made the case that the
United States could live with a nuclear Iran,
McCain simply disagrees, citing danger to the
United States and to Israel.42 Although Israeli
foreign minister Tzipi Livni has argued that a
nuclear Iran would not present an existential
threat even to Israel, McCain told the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee in
June 2008 that a nuclear Iran would present
such an existential threat.43 Absent a signifi-
cant policy reversal onMcCain’s part, Iranwill
move toward acquiring a nuclear capability,
and the United States would ultimately be
confronted with the prospect of either a
nuclear Iran or starting a war with Iran.44
Between these two options, Senator Mc-
Cainhasmade clear thathewould choosewar.
Given the American people’s significant buy-
er’s remorse over the Iraq war, they should be
very wary of McCain’s position on Iran. A war
with Iran would waste American and Iranian
lives, billions of taxpayer dollars, bog the
United States down further in theMiddle East
when it should be trying to disentangle itself,
and throw gasoline on the Islamist fire by
engaging in a third war with a Muslim coun-
try in the span of less than a decade.
The “League of Democracies”
The most creative initiative of McCain’s
foreign policy agenda can be found in his
proposal to create a “League ofDemocracies”
that would
actwhen theUNfails—to relieve human
suffering in places such as Darfur, com-
bat HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa,
fashion better policies to confront envi-
ronmental crises, provide unimpeded
market access to thosewhoendorse eco-
nomic and political freedom, and take
othermeasures unattainable by existing
regional or universal-membership sys-
tems.45
McCain replies to the major objection to this
initiative by insisting that “[t]his League of
Democracies would not supplant the UN or
other international organizations but com-
plement themby harnessing the political and
moral advantages offered by united democ-
ratic action.”46 But this does injustice to the
weight of the arguments against the idea.
First, there is ample reason to believe that
McCain sees the League as a venue for what
international relations scholars have called
“forumshopping”; that is to say, theuseofoth-
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er multilateral institutions to grant the veneer
of legitimacy to ad hoc interventions, includ-
ing military intervention. In a 2007 speech to
theHoover Institution,McCain describedhow
oneof the benefits of theLeaguewouldbe that
it could take coercive action “with or without
Moscow’s and Beijing’s approval.”47
This sort of forum shopping could make it
more likely the United States would be able to
startmore destructivewars. To take one specific
example, McCain cites Darfur as one place the
Leaguewouldbeactive.Butin2006McCainwas
writing that his preferred approach would
includeNATO “establish[ing] and enforc[ing] a
no-fly zone over Darfur to ensure that Khar-
toum ends its offensive military flights and
bombing raids,” aswell as American pressure to
“pushtheUnitedNations todrawupfirmplans
for the entrance of a robust force into Darfur
and contingency plans for the force to enter
without Sudanese consent.”48 How a more pli-
ant League of Democracies would fit into
McCain’s force-friendlystrategyforSudanisnot
hard to imagine.
At bottom, themostmeaningful deficiency
of the League of Democracies idea is that it
takes as a given that democracies agree about
approaches to foreign policy. That assumption
is a grossly oversimplified version of democrat-
ic peace theory, which has flaws of its own.49
Democratic peace theory holds that there is
something inherent in democratic governance
that precludes democracies from going to war
with other democracies. But McCain’s carries
that further, believing that democracies will
agree broadly on how to address the world’s
most vexing problems. That sort of thinking
should have been cast aside after the majority
of theworld’s leadingdemocraciesopposedthe
United States’ plunge into Iraq, for example,
but McCain continues to believe it holds
explanatory power.50
The League ofDemocracieswould be little
more than an arena in which a President
McCain could forum-shop future wars. It
also brings the prospect of dividing the globe,
pressing together two of the most significant
global powers, Russia and China, on the oth-
er side. It stands out amongMcCain’s foreign
policy ideas for being innocuous on its face,
but having significant dangers in the details.
NATO Expansion and Policy toward a
“Revanchist Russia”
The plan for a League of Democracies
holds the distinct possibility of drawing a line
across the world and indicating to Russia and
China, among others, that the United States
views themason thewrong sideof theplanet’s
divide between friend and foe. McCain favors
not only excluding Russia from the League of
Democracies, but also trying to remove the
country from the G-8.51 Making such a state-
ment publicly is a pointless gesture, given that
consensuswouldbe requiredwithin theG-8 to
actually remove Russia.Making the statement
while knowing there was little to no chance of
actually ousting Russia would reap all the
costs and none of the (dubious) benefits of
casting Russia out. Even after the Georgia-
Russia war in the summer of 2008, there is lit-
tle sign that the other G-8 powers would press
for Russia’s ouster.
Even with these provocative stances as a
backdrop,McCain simultaneously views a new,
path-breakingaccordonnuclearweaponsas an
optionwithRussia. InaMay2008speechat the
University of Denver, McCain announced that
“Russia and the United States are no longer
mortal enemies” and proposed that the two
nationswork togethermore closely onprevent-
ing the proliferation of nuclear materials and
weapons.52
But Russia will judge the United States
more by its actions than by rhetorical assur-
ances. And foreign countries—particularly for-
eign countries that are much weaker than the
United States—should be expected to react
negatively toPresidentMcCain’s efforts tooust
them from theG-8 and exclude them from the
League ofDemocracies. Tomarry a confronta-
tionalpolicyoncertain issueswitha request for
significant cooperation on anewnonprolifera-
tion initiative indicates that Senator McCain
either has not grasped the conflict between the
approaches or considers it irrelevant. Still, if
McCain expects Russia’s cooperation on pro-
liferationwhile we are busy attempting to oust
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her from international organizations and
transforming countries with which Russia has
rocky relations into securityprotectorates, he is
likely to be disappointed with the results.
McCain explained his thinking on Russia in
a 2007op-ed for theFinancialTimes. In the short
article, McCain accused Russian president
Vladimir Putin of governing with a “blend of
cynicism and Napoleonic delusion,” and pre-
sented a laundry list of issues onwhichwemust
“be firm” with Moscow, including nuclear tar-
geting; Kosovo; the Conventional Forces in
Europetreaty; theextraditionofAndreiLugovoi
(suspected of involvement in the murder of
Kremlin critic Aleksandr Litvenenko); the mys-
terious deaths of journalists in Russia; state-
ownership of media organs in Russia; state
seizureofassets;Moscow’s response toEstonia’s
treatment of a Soviet war memorial; Russia’s
handling of energy resources; and Russian poli-
cy in Ukraine, Georgia, Iran, and Sudan.53 But
even if Russia were to obey U.S. demands on
these matters, McCain offered nothing in
return,norevenabasicarchitecture for relations
with Russia. McCain’s view—that diplomacy
amounts to issuing lists of demands and then
waiting for them to be fulfilled—holds little
promise of advancingAmerican interests.
To the contrary, instead of offering benefits
to Russia in exchange for potentially meeting
American demands, McCain expects Russia to
meet these requests while Washington presses
to humiliate Russia by ousting it from the G-8
and expandingNATO to include every country
on Russia’s western border except Belarus.54
McCain told the Los Angeles World Affairs
Council in March 2008 that he would favor
NATO expansion to include “all democracies
committed to the defense of freedom.”55 In
addition, McCain wants to “increase our pro-
grams supporting freedom and the rule of law
in Russia,”meaning programs like those of the
U.S. government-funded International Repub-
licanInstitute—ofwhichMcCain ischairmanof
theboard—andotherquasi-governmentalorga-
nizations at which Russia has lashed out, and,
in some cases, banned.56
At a timewhenU.S. policy on a number of
issues from North Korea to Iran and beyond
depends on unity of effort and coordination
with other powers like Russia, McCain’s con-
frontational policy threatens to ensure
Russian obstructionism on all of those other
fronts. Further compromising the prospects
for a functional relationship with Russia is
the fact that McCain’s chief foreign policy
adviser, Randy Scheunemann, has been a key
lobbyist in the multiple drives to expand
NATO. Scheunemann lobbied on behalf of
the Baltic states during their campaign for
membership in the alliance, and later was
paid by the Georgian government to cam-
paign for GeorgianNATOmembership, even
acting as a paid lobbyist for Georgia at the
same time he was on staff as senior adviser to
the McCain for President campaign.57
Scheunemann described McCain’s views
onU.S.-Georgia relations to aGeorgian inter-
viewer thus:
It’s really about shared values, and it’s
something that Senator McCain feels
particularlydeeply.He’sbeen toGeorgia,
I think, three or four times and wit-
nessed the legendary Georgian hospital-
ity on those occasions, and it had a deep
and lasting impact onhim thatwill con-
tinue.58
WhenGeorgian presidentMikheil Saakash-
vili plunged into Russian-occupied South
Ossetia in August, providing an opening for
Russia to invade Georgia, McCain was in close
contact with Saakashvili and expanded his
tough rhetorical line against Russia. Saakash-
vili, a personal friend of McCain’s, reported to
the Washington Post that he was speaking to
McCainabout the situation inhis country “sev-
eral times a day.”59
McCain offered Saakashvili strong sup-
port, stating that the crisis should be “of grave
concern to Americans” and pledging to sup-
port NATO membership for Georgia, even
though significant chunks of Georgian terri-
torywere occupiedbyRussian troops.McCain
offered talking points on behalf of Georgia
highlighting attributes ranging from its
Christianity, to its hostingof anoil pipeline, to
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its democratic status.60 McCain took his sup-
port to new heights by declaring on the Wall
Street Journal’s op-ed page that “we are all
Georgians.”61
FromMcCain’sstatedpolicyviewstothefact
thathis chief foreignpolicy adviser is a longtime
lobbyist for NATO expansion, U.S.-Russia rela-
tions in a McCain administration could be
expected to deteriorate significantly. There are
already strong signs that the Russians are
preparing themselves for confrontation with a
President McCain. In July, a senior Russian
diplomat took the step of responding to
McCain’s statementsonRussiapolicy, threaten-
ing to cut off relations with any country con-
frontingRussia,andnotingthat“wecouldreach
a moment when we could afford to stop dis-
cussing the issues that the Americans are inter-
ested in.”62 More deterioration along these lines
can be expected ifMcCain should emerge victo-
rious inNovember.
McCain on North Korea: War Is Always
an Option
Senator McCain has held very hawkish
views on North Korea for more than a decade.
Since his scalding criticism of the Clinton
administration’s 1994 Agreed Framework,
McCain has supported keeping the military
option on the table, and at times he has hinted
that the military option should perhaps be
used. Although the Bush administration’s pol-
icyonNorthKoreahasbeenmoving inadiplo-
maticdirectionof late, andcertainly away from
the prospect of war since the North tested a
nuclear device in October 2006, it is worth
examiningMcCain’s position on the issue.
In 1994, in a speech on the Senate floor,
McCain succinctly explained his views on
North Korea (and on othermatters related to
foreign nations): “To get amule tomove, you
must show it the carrot and hit it with the
stick at the same time.” In accordance with
this thinking, McCain proposed hitting
North Korea harder with the stick, and grab-
bing a club in case the stick didn’t work:
McCain warned that although “the United
States must consider taking stronger mea-
sures should we further fail to persuade
North Korea to end this crisis . . . I do not
believe that we should resort to offensivemil-
itary actions immediately. . . . But we should
not exclude it from consideration. It should
be considered very carefully.”63
In acknowledging the risks inherent in the
military option, McCain protested that risks
could be “minimized to the greatest extent
possible.” One of the steps McCain recom-
mended in 1994 to raise the pressure and pre-
sumably deter North Korean reprisals was his
March 16 proposal that the United States
“announce that it intends to return tactical
nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula
unless North Korea permits all inspections of
its nuclear facilities . . . as required under the
terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”64
Reintroducing nuclearweapons to theKorean
peninsula would have increased the preexist-
ing impulses for numerous foreign nations to
develop nuclear weapons—as would, obvious-
ly, a massive and catastrophic war there.
Although U.S. policymakers have hoped that
such forceful measures would deter foreign
nations from seeking nuclear deterrents, there
is ample information that countries are draw-
ing the opposite lesson: that they had best
acquire their own deterrent quickly so as to
avoid becoming the target of such policies.65
McCain’s proposals on North Korea need
tobe taken in light of the implicationsof awar
on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang has long
threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire”
should the United States attack. In 1994, the
commander of U.S. forces in Korea, Gen. Gary
Luck, concluded that even a conventional war
on theKoreanpeninsulawould cost roughly 1
million human lives—including 80,000–
100,000 U.S. soldiers—and roughly $1 trillion
in damage to the global economy. Luck
summed up the results by admitting that
“unbelievable hardships would occur.”66
Clearly theUnitedStates didnot achieve its
goal of preventing advances in North Korea’s
nuclear capabilities. But by 2003, when much
more was known about the implications of
war with North Korea, McCain still did not
blanch at the gravity of the prospect. Instead,
McCain hectored the Clinton administration
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for allowing the problem to fester, and de-
clared that the solution was “rogue state roll-
back”:
The use of military force to defend vital
American security interests must always
be a last resort, as it is in this crisis. But if
we fail to achieve the international coop-
erationnecessary to end this threat, then
the countries in the region should know
with certainty that while they may risk
theirownpopulations, theUnitedStates
willdowhatever itmust toguarantee the
security of the American people. And
spare us the usual lectures about
American unilateralism. We would pre-
fer the companyofNorthKorea’s neigh-
bors, butwewillmakedowithout it ifwe
must.67
This type of thinking makes Senator
McCain’s 2007 promise to “seek to rebuild
our frayed partnership with South Korea” all
the stranger.68 The South Koreans havemade
abundantly clear that they oppose war with
the North, so McCain’s policy statements
could fray the partnership to the breaking
point.
Theworldwould be a better place ifNorth
Korea had not joined the nuclear club.69 But
it is far from clear that the world would be a
better place if North Korea had been prevent-
ed from joining the club as a result of the
United States starting a war that killed a mil-
lion people and cost a trillion dollars. The
global implications of such a conflict would
be profound, yet they seemnot to have affect-
ed SenatorMcCain’s position in the slightest.
As late as 2006, McCain was likening past
U.S. policy on Korea to British prime minis-
ter Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement poli-
cy in the 1930s and warning that there was a
real possibility that the North could attempt
to use nuclear weapons.70
As in so many other instances, Senator
McCain believes that determination, will, and
the use of the American military can produce
a beneficial outcome. But it is difficult to con-
clude that life in the United States since
October 9, 2006 (the day North Korea con-
ducted a nuclear test), has been worse than it
would have been if we had suffered the ghast-
ly consequences of a war with North Korea.
Barack Obama:
Anti-Warrior or
Liberal Interventionist?
Compared with John McCain, Barack
Obama has a short national political profile,
and consequently a shorter record of foreign
policy positions and legislative accomplish-
ments. Still, it is worth limning Senator
Obama’s track record, from the foreign policy
intellectuals whohave influencedhis thinking
to his diagnosis and prescription for the range
of foreign policy problems hewould inherit as
president.
Despite his brief national political tenure, a
significant factor in Obama’s rise to promi-
nence is the fact that he was a vocal and clear
critic of the Iraq war before it started, which
endearedhim toboth the anti-warDemocratic
base and the majority of Americans overall,
who view thewar as amistake. SenatorObama
has also been a vocal advocate of direct diplo-
macywithAmerica’s adversaries, another stand
that is well-received with the American people,
but one that causes discomfort among many
members of the Beltway foreign policy estab-
lishment.
But beyond thematter of his opposition to
the failed foreign policies of the Bush admin-
istration, it is less clear what Senator Obama’s
positive views are on foreign policy questions,
andmore importantly, how those viewswould
translate into an actual approach to theworld.
The journalist Spencer Ackerman interviewed
numerous members of the Obama foreign
policy team and encapsulated the senator’s
views as advancing
a doctrine that first ends the politics of
fear and then moves beyond a hollow,
sloganeering “democracy promotion”
agenda in favor of “dignity promotion,”
to fix the conditions of misery that
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breed anti-Americanism and prevent
liberty, justice, and prosperity from tak-
ing root.71
Thus the Obama foreign policy is focused
not on restraint, but rather on advancing liv-
ing standards abroad in pursuit of security at
home. Obama even made the striking sug-
gestion to theNew York Times’s David Brooks
that U.S. policy in Lebanon, for example,
should be focused on finding ways to com-
pete with Hezbollah by developing “amecha-
nism whereby the disaffected have an effec-
tive outlet for their grievances, which assures
them they are getting social services.”72
Surveying an Obama speech on the cam-
paign trail, journalist David Rieff found him-
self wondering “is the Democratic idea of
nationalismandofAmerica’s role in theworld
really that different from that of the Bush
administration?”73 It is worth examining the
Obama agenda to attempt to find out.
Obama the Anti-Warrior . . . on Iraq
Though themedia hasmademuch of then
state senator Obama’s 2002 speech in opposi-
tion to the Iraq war, its content has not been
scrutinized nearly so closely. Viewed in the
context of the time, when the media and for-
eign policy establishments were braying for
war with almost no dissent, Obama’s opposi-
tion looks bold and prescient. Although Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein was indeed a vile
tyrant, Obama was certain that
in concert with the international com-
munity he can be contained until, in the
way of all petty dictators, he falls away
into the dustbin of history. I know that
even a successful war against Iraq will
require a US occupation of undeter-
mined length, at undetermined cost,
with undetermined consequences. I
know that an invasion of Iraq without a
clear rationale and without strong inter-
national supportwill only fan the flames
of the Middle East, and encourage the
worst, rather than best, impulses of the
Arab world, and strengthen the recruit-
ment armofAlQaeda. I amnotopposed
to all wars. I’m opposed to dumbwars.74
A few points are worth considering. First,
the efforts to “contain” Saddam Hussein
wrought inadvertent but enormous harm on
the Iraqi people, harm that featured in al
Qaeda’s recruiting efforts and caused animus
toward the United States in the Islamic
world.75 Secondly, one can see a clear parallel
between Obama’s certainty that “all petty dic-
tators” would “fall away into the dustbin of
history” and Condoleezza Rice’s right-realist
statement of 2000 that “[t]hese regimes are liv-
ing on borrowed time, so there need be no
sense of panic about them.”76 That one can see
such an ideological lineage speaks favorably of
Obama’s instincts and poorly of the wayward
Wilsonianism of the current-day Republican
Party.
Obama’s further diagnosis of the prob-
lems with the Iraq war appeared in his 2007
Foreign Affairs article. Obama criticized the
Bush administration for having “responded
to the unconventional attacks of 9/11 with
conventional thinking of the past, largely
viewing problems as state-based and princi-
pally amenable to military solutions.”77 This
thinking indicates that Obama does not just
recognize that the war was an error, but also
why it was an error.
Still, the degree of difference between
Obama’s thinking and that of the Bush admin-
istration is unclear. Obama has kept murky his
plansonwithdrawingfromthewarthathelabels
an error, and his foreign policy advisory team
drawsheavilyfromtheClintonian,hawkishwing
of the Democratic Party as well as from the
younger faction of the Democratic establish-
ment that ismore wary ofmilitary adventurism
than either the Republicans or the center-left
holdovers from theClinton administration.
There is ample cause for concern that
Obama hews to the interventionist consen-
sus. Again, attempting to piece together dis-
parate information to form a dispositive pro-
file is impossible, but from the senator’s
thinking on the implications of “state failure”
on American security to his views on force
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structure, Senator Obama may be less of a
maverick than he has been made out to be.
Monsters under Every Bed
Senator Obama was right to oppose the
Iraq project, a war that has cost more than
4,000 American lives, split up many more
American families, and has already cost more
than$650billion.78 ButObamaappearsnot to
have grasped a truth that must be confronted
before the United States can fully shed the
reflexive, counterproductive interventionism
that has characterized U.S. grand strategy
since (at least) the end of the Cold War:
Terrorism notwithstanding, the United States
is remarkably secure. The United States still
enjoys geographic isolation, courtesy of two
oceans and two friendly border nations, and
has an economy of more than $13 trillion.
Current U.S. defense expenditures are roughly
equivalent to that of the rest of theworld com-
bined. America possesses a massive deterrent
of thousands of nuclear weapons capable of
annihilating any country on earth.
Terrorism does represent a new and chal-
lenging threat to theUnitedStates. But judged
against other threats to the lives and liveli-
hoodsofAmericancitizens, the terrorist threat
is real, but not worth radically restructuring
our government and wasting American blood
and treasure in pursuit of grandiose plans to
remake the Middle East. In 2001, the year of
the most destructive terrorist attack against
the United States in its history, more than 10
times as many Americans died from the flu as
they did from terrorism.79 Even so, few have
proposed radically altering the structureof the
American government and society to fight
influenza. A realistic assessment of the nature
of the terrorist threat should be accompanied
by the recognition that themeasures that have
been proposed to combat it have proved not
just extraordinarily costly, but also remarkably
ineffective and, inmany cases, counterproduc-
tive.
Despite his repeated disparagement of the
“politics of fear,” Senator Obama has not
grasped, or at least has not publicly stated,
this fundamental reality. Rather, he points to
a range of other threats, starting most plausi-
bly along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border
but ranging to his flawed assertion that
“extremely poor societies andweak states pro-
vide optimal breeding grounds for disease,
terrorism, and conflict, [and] the United
States has a direct national security interest in
dramatically reducing global poverty and
joining with our allies in sharing more of our
riches to help those most in need.”80
In identifying a range of other threats he
would like to fight, Obama is falling victim to
the long-standing Democratic assumption
that for a Democrat to oppose one foreign
policy debacle means that that Democrat
must propose myriad other interventions to
prove his “toughness.” The politics of this
assumption are open to debate, but themerits
ought not to be. Attempting to triage “failed
states” or doubling down on efforts to eradi-
cate poverty through the failed policies of
development aid will merely add different
errors to the foreign policy ledger.
The inherent contradiction at the heart of
Obama’s grand strategy can be seen in his
vision of what should be done with U.S.
ground forces, which President George W.
Bush has already expanded. Obama believes
we should “expand our ground forces by
adding 65,000 soldiers to the army and 27,000
marines.”81 If, under anObamapresidency, we
will not be conducting the sorts of military
adventures that the Bush administration has
concocted, and if Obama sincerely intends to
end the war in Iraq, the most proximate cause
of the strain on the force, why would we need
to expand the ground forces by 92,000 troops?
What will those troops be used for?
Aclue toObama’s thinkingon thesematters
may be found in his reliance on Samantha
Power, a scholar whomObama has argued has
“terrific expertise” on issues like Darfur.82
According to Power, “my criterion for military
intervention. . . is an immediate threat of large-
scale lossof life.”83Onecouldimagine,ofcourse,
the immediate threat of large-scale loss of life in
Darfur, in Zimbabwe, and elsewhere. Is there
reason tobelieve that a PresidentObamawould
use his extra 92,000 troops to pursue “dignity
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promotion” in Western Sudan or to fend off
Robert Mugabe’s goons outside Harare? It’s a
question the senator hasn’t been clear on.
There is anecdotal information that indi-
cates Obama is no dove: Power reported that
in an early meeting with Obama, she was
struck by the fact that “he doesn’t get weight-
ed downby the limits of American power, but
he sees youhave to grasp those limits in order
to transcend them.”84 While that may seem
incoherent or even vacuous, absent a longer
record of policymaking it is cause for concern
that Obama may be hardly less inclined to
intervention than his predecessors.
In fact, two of Obama’s closest foreign pol-
icy advisers published an article in 2006 argu-
ing for military intervention in Sudan. Susan
E. Rice and Anthony Lake, bothObama advis-
ers, argued along with Rep. Donald Payne (D-
N.J.) that the United States should threaten
and potentially take military action to force
Khartoum to halt the ongoing persecution in
Darfur. Hinting that the reason for a decision
not to intervenewouldhave to dowith the vic-
tims’ race, Rice, Lake, and Payne argued that
the United States should flout the United
Nations if necessary, relying on legitimacy
granted by NATO or some other source.85
With all of the foregoing as a backdrop, it is
worth noting that ur-neoconservative and
McCain adviser Robert Kagan reviewed a 2007
Obamaspeechandconcluded thatwhathewas
hearing was “Obama the Interventionist”: “To
Obama, everything and everyone everywhere is
of strategic concern to the United States.” The
only difference, according to Kagan, between
Obama and the preceding administration was
that“Obamabelieves theworldyearns to follow
us, if only we restore our worthiness to lead.
Personally, I like it.”86 Coming from one of the
leading thinkers behind the war in Iraq, that is
enough to raise concerns.
Direct Diplomacy with Adversaries:
Realism or Appeasement?
Kagan’s brush with admiration for Obama
has not been echoed by the interventionist
mainstream. Instead, many hawkish analysts
have focused onObama’s willingness to nego-
tiate directly with adversarial regimes, charg-
ing that Senator Obama may cut deals that
would endanger the security of the United
States. Obama’s willingness to engage in nor-
mal diplomacy with “rogue states” represents
a prudent break with the Bush administra-
tion, and, accordingly, it, too, deserves exami-
nation.
According to Senator Obama, “Our policy
of issuing threats and relying on intermedi-
aries to curb Iran’s nuclear program, sponsor-
ship of terrorism, and regional aggression is
failing.” Instead, Obama proposes that with
Iran and other adversarial states, “[t]ough-
mindeddiplomacy, backedby thewhole range
of instruments of American power—political,
economic, and military—could bring success
even when dealing with long-standing adver-
saries such as Iran and Syria.”87 Expanding on
that theme, Obama’s campaignwebsite adver-
tises that the candidate believes that “not talk-
ing doesn’t make us look tough—it makes us
look arrogant, it denies us opportunities to
make progress, and it makes it harder for
America to rally international support for our
leadership.”88
On the issue of preconditions and whether
tonegotiatewithAmerica’s adversaries,Obama
represents a genuine change that gets beyond
the schoolyard approach that has characterized
the general attitudeof theBushadministration
toward diplomacy. Underpinning the premise
that the United States should not negotiate
with countries over disagreements is the idea
that doing sowouldunduly grant legitimacy to
the governments in question, dampening or
discouraging domestic opposition to the gov-
ernment.
But this is a pernicious idea. There is little
evidence that refusing to negotiate with any
given government has ever decreased its legit-
imacy such that domestic opposition has
toppled it. Moreover, if the larger, stronger
party to negotiations is looking for opportu-
nities to change the regime in the weaker
country, it is unlikely that that regime will
view any deal as offered in good faith.
Neoconservatives will object that the Reagan
administration was seeking ways to unravel
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the Soviet regime while negotiating with it,
but in fact the example proves the opposite.
There is a difference between exploiting the
deficiencies in an opposing regime and the
sort of slipshod “regime change” that neo-
conservatives favor.
The Reagan administration is the best his-
torical example of two dueling instincts in the
American diplomatic tradition: hubris and
humility. Throughout theReagan administra-
tion, neoconservatives andother hawkish ana-
lysts fretted that President Reagan was reck-
lessly engaging in diplomacy with a stronger,
savvier Soviet Union that would inevitably
trick the less-competent Reagan into making
bad deals that would harm the national secu-
rity of theUnitedStates. The shrillest criticism
of Reagan was perhaps neoconservative
thinker Norman Podhoretz’s lament that the
president was “following a strategy of helping
the Soviet Union stabilize its empire, rather
than . . . encouraging the breakdown of that
empire from within.” Less than 10 years later,
of course, the Soviet Union had finished
breaking down fromwithin.89
The lesson in all of this is that normal
diplomacy is not appeasement. Bad deals and
good deals aremade in the course of diploma-
cy, but neither result should damnor exalt the
enterprise in general. Instead, diplomacymust
be judgedagainst theotherpossible approach-
es to foreign nations. When compared to a
policy that issues demands that will almost
certainly go unfulfilled, backed up by the
threat of preventive military action (as things
stand with the Iran example), diplomacy
deserves at least to be tried before truculence
and eventual invasion is presented as a respon-
sible alternative.
Still, Senator Obama’s remarks leave open
the alarming possibility that he views diplo-
macy as a panacea; that talking with adver-
saries will necessarily work, without examin-
ing the prospect of what he thinks we should
do if diplomacy fails. There are obviously
domestic and international political reasons
for keeping his views on these matters
unknown, but his remarks about Iran, for
example, indicate that Obama largely agrees
with McCain’s view of the threat.
For example, during Obama’s July 2008
visit to Israel, Obama stated that “a nuclear
Iran would pose a grave threat and the world
must prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon.”90 Obama then returned from the
trip to theMiddle East andmet with congres-
sionalDemocrats, reportedly telling themthat
“if the Iranians don’t accept a deal now
because they think they’re going to get a better
deal from the next administration, they’re
mistaken.”91
There are several problems with these
statements. First, it is irresponsible for a U.S.
presidential candidate to travel to Israel and
indulge the narrative that the Israeli right
and American neoconservatives have been
advancing: namely, that a nuclear Iran would
present an existential threat because Iran
would supposedly launchnuclearweapons at
Israel unprovoked. There is, simply put, no
evidence to support that assertion, but it is,
unsurprisingly, enough to cause extreme dis-
tress in Tel Aviv. American leaders need to
reinforce reality on the subject of Iran, not
check boxes to satisfy various constituencies
at home or abroad. A nuclear Iran would
pose different—but serious—problems for
Israel and the United States.92 This fact can
be acknowledged between the two allies with-
out destroying the relationship.
Secondly, the current strategy is almost
certain to fail. Obamahas indicated hewould
drop the Bush administration’s insistence on
preconditions to negotiations, which increas-
es the chances that serious talks could take
place. At the same time, keeping Iran nonnu-
clear should be a high enough priority that
Obama should be willing to make additional
concessions if they were required for achiev-
ing that goal. If Obama is stating that he
would enter the negotiations with the posi-
tion that he is unwilling to sweeten the deal
the Bush administration has offered, then
the United States is likely going to have to
decide between a war with Iran and a nuclear
or near-nuclear Iran. It would be preferable
for the United States to maintain flexibility
on the exact contours of its position since
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changes could be necessary to come up with
a deal that would prevent Iran’s acquisition
of a nuclear capability.
Finally, Obama’s statement that the world
“must” prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon does not leave much wiggle room for
an Obama administration should diplomacy
fail. That statement easily would be used by
political opposition to brandObama as a flip-
flopper and appeaser should he decide that
the United States could, in fact, live with a
nuclear Iran. The danger is that somuch hope
is invested in diplomacy that the candidate
and his advisers have not adequately consid-
ered their options if diplomacy were to fail.
The prospect of diplomatic failure is real.
Senator McCain has been clear that he would
start a war to try to prevent a nuclear Iran.
Parsing Senator Obama’s statements on the
subject, it looks ominously uncertain whether
he would do the same.
Crossing the Rubicon into Pakistan:
Pursuing al Qaeda or Destabilizing
Pakistan?
One of the few areas in which Senator
Obama has been criticized as being too hawk-
ishwashisAugust2007 remark—inaprepared
speech, not an off-the-cuff answer to a ques-
tion—that “if we have actionable intelligence
about high-value terrorist targets [in Pakistan]
and President Musharraf won’t act, we will.”93
SenatorMcCain criticized this remark, calling
Obama “naïve” and noting that “You don’t
broadcast that you are going to bomb a coun-
try that is a sovereign nation and that you are
dependent on . . . in the struggle against (the)
Taliban and the sanctuaries which they
hold.”94
McCain raises a fair point, but obscures the
policy question with a question of rhetoric. It
is important to note that openly threatening
to violate the sovereignty of a nuclear-armed
Islamic country is imprudent and, at best,
extraordinarily poor public diplomacy. The
remark elicited predictable outrage among cit-
izens and government officials in Pakistan.95
There was no reason to stir the pot of anti-
Americanism with such a remark, other than
perhaps the inchoate feeling among Dem-
ocrats thatAmericanswill not elect apresident
who does not make some number of hawkish
remarks about various foreign countries.
But the larger policy question—whether to
attack high-value al Qaeda targets in Pakistan
on the basis of “actionable intelligence”—is
one in which Senator Obama’s thinking is
hardly strange. It is standing policy of the
United States that U.S. forces would pursue
such leads, and they have done so more than
once in the past.
In June 2004, for example, amissile strike in
South Waziristan killed Nek Mohammed, a
pro-Talibanmilitant, andanumberofhis asso-
ciates. Locals on the scene offered what they
said was evidence of U.S. involvement, but
Pakistani officials repeatedly denied this, stat-
ing that the attack was an operation of the
Pakistani security forces. Although a PBS
Frontline investigation would later conclude
that Mohammed was hit by a Hellfire missile
fired fromaU.S. Predator drone over Pakistan,
the Pakistani government to this day attempts
to obscure the American character of the raid.
Other raids occurred as recently as September
2008, where U.S. Special Operations forces
chasedmilitants into SouthWaziristan and an
unmanned aerial vehicle launched a strike that
killed 23 people.96
So on the policy question, Senator Obam-
a’s thinking is in line with established
American policy—President Bush’s estab-
lishedpolicy. SenatorMcCainhas said little to
explicitly support or oppose President Bush’s
incursions into Pakistan, but ob-servers
ought not to judge Obama’s proposal as
being bizarre or erratic. Still, the policy ques-
tion is an open one: is it worth possibly desta-
bilizing Pakistan by eroding governmental
authority in flagrantly violating its sovereign-
ty to pursue terrorists across the border? That
would be a valuable debate to have, but unfor-
tunately too much of the discussion has
focused on the semantic aspects of whether
Obama advocated “bombing Pakistan” or
pressing “hot pursuit” into Pakistan.
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Strategic Hypochondria:
An Ailment Shared by
Both Candidates
Though there are significant differences
between the two candidates, it is important
not to overstate the degree of disagreement.
There aremany important issues onwhich the
candidates agree. As Cindy Williams of MIT
observed in surveyingMcCain’s,Obama’s, and
Hillary Clinton’s essays in Foreign Affairs:
All three see terrorism, non-state actors,
andweakor failed states as threats to the
United States. All are concerned about
rising powers. All insist on the need for
U.S. leadership. All believe in the use of
force to prevent atrocities abroad. All
strongly supportNATO, though they all
want it to domore. Obama andClinton
note that they subscribe to the unilater-
al use of force; McCain is silent on the
matter in the article, but he surely con-
curs. All rate nuclear proliferation as a
very serious problem; all agree Iranmust
be prevented from getting nuclear
weapons; all are open to a military solu-
tion to Iran’s nuclear programs.97
There are differences between the two candi-
dates on a range of issues. But neither candi-
date is likely to transform the foundations of
American foreign policy.
Both candidates, for example, responded to
the fraudulent March 2008 elections in
Zimbabwe by calling for Zimbabwean dictator
Robert Mugabe’s removal from power.98 Al-
though Obama was characteristically less con-
frontational than McCain, both candidates
think theUnitedStates shouldbe attempting to
findwaystoousttheZimbabweandictator.They
further thinkthatbluster fromWashing-toncan
help the process along. And both of them fail to
see how counterproductive American heckling
can be to the democratic opposition, and how
perilousblanketcondemnationsofgovernments
can be in terms of American foreign policy. No
doubtPresidentClintonhadnotthefaintestidea
upon signing the Iraq Liberation Act into law
and making “regime change” the official policy
of the United States in 1998 that the United
StateswouldbepatrollingthestreetsofSadrCity
a decade later. The “humility” that George W.
Bush called for in American foreign policy in
2000 remains as elusive as ever.
Obama’s agreement with John McCain on
Georgia is but themost recent piece of evidence
indicating that Obama is hardly as much of a
change agent as some have suggested. Obama
releasedastatementonAugust11,withRussian
troops across Georgian territory, highlighting
his call for a “deeper [Georgian] relationship”
withNATOand theUnited States, and reiterat-
ed his support for a Membership Action Plan
towardNATOaccession forGeorgia.99 Offering
a security guarantee to a countrywith two sepa-
ratist regions backed (and occupied) by Russia
represents a lack of seriousness on the part of
SenatorObama.It is trulyaudaciousforSenator
Obama to support NATO membership for
Georgia and expect robust Russian cooperation
on important American objectives like securing
loose nuclearmaterials.
The Choice
Asmentioned in the introduction, attempt-
ing to ascertain what a candidate would do
with U.S. foreign policy if he should be elected
president is anuncertain endeavor.Anyone try-
ing to do so in 2000 would likely have judged
candidate George W. Bush entirely wrongly. If
anything, Bush’s conduct as president was as
direct a repudiation of his views on the cam-
paign trail that one could imagine.
Analysts who have attempted to deter-
mine the foreign policy style of JohnMcCain
have grappled with his history of being will-
ing to buck Republican Party orthodoxy. The
New Republic’s John Judis, who wrote an arti-
cle in 2006 arguing that there was reason to
believe that a President McCain would gov-
ern more realistically than the rhetoric of
CandidateMcCain would lead one to believe,
circled back to the issue in 2008 only to con-
clude that this was “wishful thinking”:
17
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McCain continues to rely on the same
neoconservative advisers; he still thinks
U.S. foreign policy should focus on
transforming rogue states and autocra-
cies into democracies that live under
the shadow of American power; and he
no longer tells credulous reporters that
he consults [former National Security
Adviser Brent] Scowcroft. . . . If John
McCain’s foreign policy is changing, it
is only becoming more combustible,
not less.100
Given available evidence, this judgment is
unassailable. Senator McCain believes in a
near-limitless capacity of American power, he
continues to hold close the same neoconser-
vative advisers that led him into a relation-
ship with Ahmed Chalabi and to promote
forced regime change in Iraq, and he looks to
have learned little from the enterprise in Iraq
beyond “the surge is working.”
There is now, as there was with Bush in
2000, the chance that McCain could become
president and govern in amanner significantly
different from his rhetoric as a candidate. But
one cannot judge candidates on suppositions
about unknown futures. Although McCain’s
early years inCongress fitmuch lessneatly into
any one foreign policy vision, for at least the
past decade, Senator McCain has made clear
that President McCain would expand on the
errors of the Bush doctrine, and deepen the
United States’ militarized, counterproductive
approach to the rest of the world on issues
related to terrorism and beyond. In the words
of Time columnist Joe Klein, “McCain would
place a higher priority on finding new enemies
than cultivating new friends.”101
Senator Obama, by contrast, is less known.
His opposition to the Iraqwar and support for
normal diplomacy with various adversaries
represents a positive change for American for-
eign policy. But he remains surrounded by a
group of advisers some of whom have pro-
posed attacking Sudan and North Korea, and
who broadly endorse the principles of ad hoc
humanitarian intervention.102 Obama misdi-
agnoses the cause of our terrorism problem,
promising to fight terrorism by attempting to
“roll back the tide of hopelessness that gives
rise to hate.”103
The best case that can bemade for Senator
Obama’s foreign policy is the fact that the
alternative to his approach is Senator Mc-
Cain’s. There are a number of other issues on
which the candidates differ,104 but Senator
McCain’s views on foreign policy andmilitary
issues are frequently stated, strongly held, and
deeply misguided. A President McCain would
promise more provocation, more interven-
tion, andmore strain on themilitary, the bud-
get, and the country.
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